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Historically, relations between church and state in independent Zimbabwe have tended to be co-
operative and on-confrontational.  However, in 1997 the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) 
initiated the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), leading to the government’s defeat in the 
first post-independence referendum and setting the stage for the violent elections of June 2000.  
Nevertheless, as the NCA developed the strength and capacity which enabled it to challenge the 
status-quo, the ZCC withdrew.  As a key-player said ‘… as churches we had to take issues that 
don’t raise too much dust or rock the boat too much, but the boat was rocking.’ 
 
This suggests that although the church may play a critical role in opening up space for debate, the 
state may  still co-opt and weaken churches and other groups, in its effort to retain hegemony.  
Churches and church-NGOs relate ambiguously to both the state and to society – in both colonial 
and post-colonial Zimbabwe – and remain vulnerable to political, economic, and social pressures. 
 Theories of democratization – and in particular the role played by churches and NGOs – must 





Zimbabwe has a rich literature on the role of churches and church organizations in the 
colonial period, which neatly captures the complexity of their relations to the Rhodesian state.1 
Yet, post-independence church-state relations have been little studied.  Upon investigation, many 
similarities between the earlier literature and the post independence period become apparent – 
especially in terms of relations between state elites and church elites.2  These parallels suggest 
that attempts to understand state-society relations should take into account these earlier studies of 
how organizations interact with states and examine them from a historical perspective.  The 




This article examines relations between church elites and the state in independent 
Zimbabwe through the prism of church organizations.  This includes platforms through which the 
hierarchies of churches come together like the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) 
and its subordinate body, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), which is an 
NGO run by lay-people.  In contrast, the protestant denominational heads meet as the Zimbabwe 
Council of Churches (ZCC) and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), both of which 
are also NGOs with mainly lay staff. 
Although NGOs are widely discussed in the African politics literature, church NGOs are 
often regarded simply as conduits of either development goods or democratization.3  Indeed, 
while NGOs in general are often romanticized, church-NGOs are even less critically examined.4  
This is despite their prominence in development activities which gives them great social 
importance in Zimbabwe and in many other African countries.5  While enthusiasts of the 
civil-society paradigm often see NGOs in normative terms, as an essential precondition for 
democratization, the historical parallels between UDI-era Rhodesia and post-independence 
Zimbabwe suggest that the churches and their ancillary organizations are not a uniformly 
democratic or progressive force. 
On an organizational level,  NGOs and churches are vulnerable to the state's top-down 
co-option and containment. Institutionally, their dependence on foreign donor funding and 
tendency to become professionalized isolates them from the larger Zimbabwean society and 
imparts a self-referential quality to many of their activities.   More generally, both the NGO 
community and the clerics – who are of course  from  Zimbabwe's educated elite – have been 
wary about confronting the Mugabe government, insofar as they would have much to lose in such 
a confrontation.  For example, they have frequently used a public discourse in which seemingly 
apolitical ‘development’ is stressed over explicit political action.6  This has not, however, 
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resulted in the complete depoliticization of the church-NGO community. Indeed, the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) case study presented below indicates just how involved it was in 
opening up political debate. Nonetheless, at crucial moments, Zimbabwe's institutional churches 
have tended to hedge their bets – always looking for a safe way out of confrontation with the 
ruling ZANU(PF) should they end up on the losing side. While this ambivalence may be a 
prudent long-term strategy for institutions whose concerns are not purely temporal, it is at the 
heart of their ambiguous political role in post-independence Zimbabwe. 
This article first discusses the experience of the historic mission churches in Zimbabwe 
during UDI and then after independence and then  presents two case studies.  The first documents 
church-NGO ventures into economic policy advocacy between 1990 and 1997.  The second deals 
with their initiation of the constitution-writing process in Zimbabwe between 1997 and 2000.  
Finally, some conclusions are drawn from these cases, proposing that church-NGO structures 
provide a framework from within which political advocacy can be undertaken, but that, like other 
NGOs, they may also be subject to co-option and contain organizational weaknesses that prevent 
them being more effective governmental critics.  
 
Church-State relations in Zimbabwe 
The study of religious organizations in public life has become increasingly salient to the study of 
African politics in recent decades.  Whereas during the Cold War churches were easily dismissed 
as agents of American imperialism,7 scholars are now more sensitive to their role in catalyzing 
internal political change, as in the cases of Malawi and Kenya, the West African national 
conferences, and South Africa.8  Yet this newer literature, perhaps buoyed by optimism like the 
democratization literature more broadly, tends to romanticize such groups.9  An historical 
approach, in contrast, contributes to a more sophisticated analysis of church-state relations. 
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The attitude of churches to the Smith regime after its unilateral declaration of 
independence (UDI) in 1963 was ambiguous and varied over time and between denominations.  
Some supported the guerrilla war while others backed the internal settlement, and some 
collaborated with the Smith regime.  Bishops Skelton and Lamont of the Anglican and Catholic 
churches respectively took principled stands against the Rhodesian regime and in support of the 
guerrilla war,  yet others within their churches participated in the Smith regime.10  After Bishop 
Skelton left Zimbabwe, the Anglican Church, more integrated into Rhodesian society, became 
increasingly supportive of the UDI regime.11  While members of Catholic missions played crucial 
roles in negotiating with the guerrillas in the rural areas during the liberation war, they did so as 
individuals rather than on behalf of the church.12  In general, members of the Roman Catholic 
priesthood were more inclined to side with the guerrillas because their church was more 
influenced by international pressures and their personal histories (especially those who had 
experience of colonialism or fascism), while their unmarried status isolated them somewhat from 
Rhodesian mores.13  With respect to the protestant denominations, Terence Ranger has proposed 
that to many early converts Methodism was inherently political.14  Still, the church took the less 
radical position of supporting the internal settlement advocated by Methodist Bishop Muzorewa’s 
United African National Congress (UANC) party, which had rejected the armed struggle.   
Yet while the churches carried on their day-to-day functions, NGO wings of the church 
were called upon, even designed, to carry out the more ‘political’ aspects of the churches’ 
mandate.  In 1967, despite internal tensions,  the Rhodesian Council of Churches (RCC; later 
ZCC) created a new organization – Christian Care – to aid the detainees and their families.15  
Similarly, the Catholic Bishops created the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in 
1972, which enabled the Catholic Church to play an advocacy role in documenting the human 
rights abuses of the Rhodesian security apparatus and civil institutions.16  
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Relations between the post-independence state and particular denominations depended to 
some extent on the stances which they had adopted during the liberation war.17  However, with 
few exceptions the churches linked themselves to the state’s developmentalist ambitions, in both 
discourse and praxis.  Indeed, twenty years after independence church hierarchies continue to be 
intertwined with the state and the ruling ZANU (PF).18  Although Maxwell has suggested that 
some age-groups and factions within the Pentecostal churches sought to distance themselves from 
the state, he also suggests that their hierarchies may court Presidential approval (and vice-versa), 
although this may have changed with the recent popularity of the Movement for Democratic 
Change.19   
The post-independence Zimbabwean state has attempted to establish its hegemony over 
civil institutions which might have been tempted towards autonomy such as the labour 
movement, students, NGOs, and churches.  Indeed, many of these organizations, with their 
origins in the struggle for independence, were only too keen to accommodate themselves with the 
new progressive state.20  At the same time, those churches implicated in support for the UANC 
internal settlement, such as the Methodists (and by association the ZCC), attempted  to (re)gain 
favour with the government.  While the state was not shy of demanding the obedience and 
participation of the churches in the development process, it stopped short of legislating explicit 
controls on them.21  Instead, the President, Rev. Canaan Banana (an ordained Methodist) and the 
Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe (a lay Catholic) both called for unity between the churches and 
state, in which the churches would co-operate in ‘developing’ the newly independent 
Zimbabwe.22 
The state, however, did take a more active interest in ZCC affairs.  In November 1981, 
President Banana criticized the ZCC  in the national press for taking a ‘wait and see’ attitude 
towards the government.23  The involvement of Bishop Muzorewa – who had been President of 
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the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia – with the ZCC, apparently led the state to see it as a 
political irritant.  Moreover, a breakdown of communication between the ZCC and its parent 
body, the World Council of Churches (WCC), which had taken a more accommodating position, 
led to donor funds being withheld.24  These developments led the ZCC to replace its general 
secretary, in the hope of restoring relations with both the state and the WCC. 
The most significant post-independence division between church and state came as the 
state sent troops into Matabeleland, allegedly to quell ‘dissident’ activity instigated by ZAPU, 
which retained political strength in the area, and South Africa. The activities of the security 
forces against the civilian population of Matabeleland, led to numerous reports of human rights 
abuses being made to the CCJP.  Their attempts to document and publicize the abuses being 
perpetrated by the security forces were rebuffed and denied by the state.25  At the peak of the 
conflict, the CCJP Director, Nick Ndebele and the Chairman, Mike Auret, were arrested, 
although they were eventually freed by direct intervention of Prime Minister Mugabe.26   
Despite such sanctions, the CCJP continued to pursue cases of human rights violations, 
and finally in 1997 published a definitive and detailed report on the Matabeleland atrocities.  
However, the Bishops’ Conference, which oversees the CCJP, demonstrated their deference by 
refusing to release the report without the President’s approval.27  The report was later leaked 
through the South African weekly Mail and Guardian.28  
With the exception of the CCJP, ‘... politically churches have avoided criticizing the 
government openly [they] feel it is not yet time for open confrontation with government since 
they have access to the government officials concerned to voice their fears and concerns’.29 
Indeed the option of co-option/engagement with the state is often more attractive than either dis-
engagement or opposition to the state.  The Anglicans, along with the Pentecostal movement,  
linked themselves fervently to Mugabe’s crusade against homosexuals in Zimbabwe.30  The 
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Catholic Church has also retained its close links with the Mugabe family – two of the President’s 
sisters worked at Silveira House and Bishop Mutume recently married President Mugabe to his 
young secretary, despite widespread public condemnation.31  The Methodist church, as Banana 
notes, ‘unfortunately’ kept silent on the massacres in Matabeleland and the violence that occurred 
in the lead up to the 1985 and 1990 elections.  In his study of the Methodist church Banana fails 
to propose any reason for this quiescence, although it is obvious that the church was reluctant to 
criticize the state.32  Gifford has also suggested that the refusal of the former Anglican Bishop of 
Harare to retire, restricted the church’s ability to criticize President Mugabe’s similar reluctance 
to hand-over the reins of power.33  
  
Church-organizations: from the developmental to the political 
Church-NGOs in Africa play an increasingly crucial roles in bringing development assistance.34 
In Zimbabwe, church-NGOs are prominent and well-established, but their agendas have changed 
over the 20 years of independence from the developmental and towards the political. At 
independence, as attempts were made to redress the effects of guerrilla war and profound racial 
inequalities, NGOs  concentrated on ‘development,’ for example, Silveira House – the Jesuit run 
training and development centre, the YWCA and the YMCA,  and Christian Care.  
Because of their origins in the independence war and the post-war rebuilding effort of the 
1980s, most church organizations in Zimbabwe have been primarily developmental 
organizations, and have thus been particularly vulnerable to the co-optive tendencies  of the state. 
 However, Silveira House has had a ‘civics’ department since before Independence, focussing on 
leadership training, and, as discussed above, the CCJP has a long history of human rights 
activism.35   
In the 1990s, as elsewhere in Africa, there was a tendency – encouraged by donor funding 
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– for both NGOs and churches to take up activities such as policy advocacy, civic education, 
voter education, and election monitoring.  Older organizations like the ZCC expanded their range 
of operations, creating a  Justice, Peace and Reconciliation (JPR) desk in 1993.36  After the 1995 
general election, the ZCC and the CCJP joined with other organizations which monitored the 
vote to create the Church/NGO Civic Education Project.    
New organizations also emerged to fill the funding ‘niche’.  Ecumenical Support Services 
(ESS), formed in the early 1990s and funded by European church NGOs, began training NGOs to 
do ‘advocacy’.  ESS  is unusual within the community of church-based NGOs both because it is 
not formally linked to a church and because it does not do ‘development’ work.  
The ZCC has described its JPR desk as playing a ‘midwifery role’ to bring the government 
into dialogue with civil society.  The Council often uses this term to justify its interventions in 
public affairs, yet it also enables them to deny the politically risky consequences.37  For example, 
when a ZCC-organized meeting between NGOs and a government Ministry became acrimonious, 
the ZCC representative reiterated that the Council’s role was limited to that of a ‘midwife’ – 
bringing state and society together, but not taking a stand on the issues.  In response, a voice from 
the audience whispered ‘he is scared’.38  Indeed, when I naively questioned the then General 
Secretary as to ‘why the ZCC was becoming so political’ he repeatedly insisted  that it was not-
political.39 
By the mid-1990s, this ‘non-political’ role of the ZCC had come to be seen as a 
strategically useful ‘umbrella’ for holding meetings which might otherwise arouse the interest of 
the security apparatus.  Yet despite this rubric of ‘midwifery’ and desire to cast itself as apolitical, 
the ZCC did rapidly became politically controversial in the late 1990s.  It is this new foray into 
formal politics with which this paper is primarily concerned.  The two cases below trace the 





The Politics of Economic Policy-making: 1990-1997 
In 1991 Zimbabwe implemented an economic structural adjustment and liberalization programme 
(ESAP).  As in other countries, ESAP led to retrenchments, removal of subsidies, and the 
implementation of school fees and health user-fees.  Unlike other countries, in the initial years of 
structural adjustment, Zimbabwe had few riots and no political party opposed the policy.40  
Indeed, the more prominent opposition groups urged stronger forms of liberalization.   Between 
1991 and 1994, during the implementation of ESAP, NGOs were little involved in advocacy –  
although efforts were made to stimulate debate  about ESAP by the CCJP, Silveira House and 
within the Methodist Synod.41   
From 1994 onwards, however, a small group of mostly church-based NGOs came  together 
under the aegis of Ecumenical Support Services (ESS) to discuss the impact of structural 
adjustment on them, and their members.  Yet the  Lobbying and Advocacy Group (LAG), as they 
called themselves,  was unsuccessful in both dealing with the government and in attempting to 
recruit more NGOs to their cause.  
In 1995, the World Bank  approached Zimbabwean NGOs for dialogue on the second 
phase of ESAP, in preparation for the annual IMF/World Bank meetings.  In response,  LAG 
proposed that ‘... [the people] are required to take an active role in defining the development 
paradigm, through churches, civic groups, and NGOs’.42  The NGOs urged the government to 
make structural adjustment (now known as ZIMPREST) more participatory and be accountable, 
claiming that as ‘development actors’ they must be involved in the planning process.43  A World 
Bank poverty mission, which arrived in April 1996, also met with LAG.  LAG further established 
an internal taskforce to evaluate ZIMPREST, yet this taskforce was rendered ineffectual because 
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the Finance Ministry would not reveal the draft ZIMPREST document.44   LAG organized letters 
of protest about this  lack of consultation.45  The Ministry responded in what appeared to be an 
encouraging tone, welcoming the participation of civil society.  However, hearing nothing further 
from the Ministry about participation, LAG, in late September 1996, forwarded a petition signed 
by 58 individuals, again requesting to be involved;  there was no further response.   
In November 1996, the ZCC hosted a 2 day national meeting on ZIMPREST ‘... a platform 
for civic actors and actresses, men and women of Zimbabwe, an opportunity to rethink and 
reliance the development process in Zimbabwe ...’.46  Yet this bold attempt floundered when the 
Minister responsible failed to attend the workshop.  Since none of the participants had actually 
seen the ZIMPREST document, it was difficult to debate it concretely.  The result of the ZCC 
workshop input is unclear, as a  ZCC official ironically stated,  ‘we sent it [the statement produced 
by workshop] to the Minister and didn’t hear from him.  We then sent it to ZANU(PF) after we 
heard that they make the policies.’47  
In February 1997, the Finance Minister was invited to address a LAG meeting to be held in 
March, which he refused to attend because ‘the ZIMPREST document was still in its draft stage 
...’As he explained, the:  
... draft document is in the process of being discussed by heads of Ministries and 
the Cabinet.  Thereafter the document will be discussed widely by the various 
stakeholders in a series of workshops. It is hoped that your organization will be 
invited to attend the workshops for your inputs ...48  
 
The irony that the document would only be discussed by ‘stakeholders’ when it was no longer in a 
draft stage, was not lost on the recipients.  As NGOs were never invited to ‘workshops or 
consultations’, LAG stalled, and the NGOs moved on to other issues.  
Inspired by the  international Jubilee 2000 campaign, which had criticized the impact of 
debt-loads on developing countries and the South African Kairos document, in which Christians 
 
 11 
were called upon to reject the apartheid state, ESS had convened a regional workshop in October 
1996 on Prophetic Action.49  This meeting was attended by the prominent churchmen from 
Zambia and South Africa – Rev. Edwin Sakala of the Zambian Christian Council and Dr. Molefe 
Tsele of the Institute for Contextual Theology in South Africa – as well as church-people and laity 
from Zimbabwe.  The enthusiasm for the three-day meeting led to the idea of writing a ‘Kairos’ 
document for Zimbabwe which could then be used within churches for discussion or action.50  
The Kairos process revealed most strongly the importance of both language and content in 
the advocacy process.  The former President, Rev. Banana, also Zimbabwe’s most controversial 
theologian, called for a ‘collective onslaught by the government, NGOs, churches and the people 
themselves’ against the impact of structural adjustment, although discussions also stressed issues 
of governance, youth, AIDS, gender and the environment.  Yet, despite the meeting being entitled 
‘A Call to Action’ – designed explicitly to move the churches towards action, participants felt 
insulted, rather than challenged, by Rev. Banana’s call to ‘more and more programmes of action’ 
in place of ‘pious prayers’; Banana’s ‘combat theology’ did not appeal to all.51  
Drafting committees met to address the three main areas of concern – governance, 
economic justice, and gender and youth – through the drafting of a ‘Kairos’ document.  At each 
meeting drafts were prepared, then read out and discussed.  On the following morning, participants 
would examine a typed draft of the previous day’s discussions, and begin to discuss the impact of 
the word-usage, and, in some cases, add/derive a theological basis for the arguments being made.  
Participants balanced their desire to be critical, with the knowledge that if they were too shrill, the 
government would not  listen.   
As the highest profile participant in the drafting process, Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Mutare, Bishop Muchabaiwa had the most to lose by being connected with the project.  He was 
most insistent that the document must be sent to the President before it was released and 
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absolutely refused to allow the inclusion of any reference to the Matabeleland crisis.  But it was 
not just the inclusion/exclusion of material or the fashion in which it was released which 
concerned him, but also the language used in the document.  He warned participants that ‘we 
should speak with the voice of God ... we must avoid speaking like an opposition party’.52  
Subsequently, he again reminded participants, ‘[w]e are people sent by God to say something 
about our country ... We are not political people’.53  And indeed, the most intractable debates were 
less about the inclusion of material – sexuality, references to vote-rigging, or Matabeleland –  but 
instead about toning down the explicitly ‘political’ language in the document.   
 
Institutional constraints 
The advocacy and lobbying efforts of Zimbabwean NGOs described above were  constrained by 
the institutions and sub-culture in which they were embedded, which did not  facilitate a broader 
mobilizational role. These workshops and meetings were typical of the way NGOs in Zimbabwe 
work:  ‘closed shop’ elitist meetings where NGO professionals  meet each other regularly.  The 
timing of these meetings frequently excluded those who had day-jobs, but who were still 
interested in these issues. Moreover,  relatively few denominations or churches were involved.   In 
general, personal links were more powerful than neutral appeals through mail-outs – most who 
attended the meetings or workshops discussed had prior connections to the host organization. 
 A related point is that often the same people, from the same organizations, participated in 
all of these meetings.  NGO activity often seemed to degenerate into an in-club of regular 
participants, although more participatory events such as election monitoring reveal a wider  
potential constituency.  Still, NGOs have ‘professionalized’ their activities, and are no longer run 
by part-time activists.  One consequence of this development is that their staff and the clergy can 
sometimes be unwilling to meet outside of work hours which limits the participation of the laity.  
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Gifford has suggested that as the state weakens and is no longer a clear career path, the churches 
become an increasing attractive option.54  Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that NGOs, as a 
conduit for donor funds, are often attractive routes for employment.55  Church NGOs, combining 
these two trends, may prove to be especially vulnerable to pressures towards ‘professionalization’ 
and a concomitant decrease in their mobilizational capacity. 
Yet, the few times that the wider public was included, the results were substantial.  For 
example, when ESS organized a  series of public meetings on social justice and theological issues 
held in the Harare city-centre after five pm,  a wide range of people attended.   The consistently  
high level of attendance at such meetings suggests that there is a large constituency of people keen 
to debate such issues, yet they are rarely incorporated into further events.   
In short, because of organizational and institutional weaknesses, the NGOs had little 
success in lobbying the government or mobilizing their fellow citizens to do so.  NGOs won no 
concessions from the Ministry of Finance, and were left out of consultations on structural 
adjustment and the budget.  Indeed, the NGOs had more meetings with the World Bank than with 
their own government.  Their efforts neither reached wide audiences, nor stirred up political 
debate.  Nevertheless, as the political climate changed and as the economic climate worsened, 
church-NGOs took on a much bigger role in Zimbabwe’s political life. 
 
 The ZCC and the NCA: The politics of constitution-writing 
In 1997, the ZCC called a meeting for NGOs, churches and unions interested in discussing the 
constitution.  Like most projects, this was not undertaken at the behest of the ZCC hierarchy but 
was rather at the initiative of lay staff who had received donor funding.  This group became the 
nucleus of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) which was launched in January 1998.  
NCA discussions of the constitution – a ‘non-political’ way of talking about the exercise of 
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politics – rapidly gained momentum because they  provided a framework within which it was 
possible to talk safely about political issues.  Some participants wanted the NCA to be a free-
standing body, autonomous from the ZCC, but were told in response in response that ‘we need an 
umbrella ... the church is always considered impartial.  If we have ZCC as our umbrella no one 
will say we are being political.’56  Even an outspoken human rights activist suggested that ‘[t]here 
is risk of a boycott or attack if not under ZCC ... maybe we should form an [autonomous] body 
corporate?  But the ZCC umbrella is strategically a good one.’57  It is this new ‘political’ activity – 
and the government’s reaction to it – which marks a fundamental shift in the relations of church-
NGOs to the state.   
Although donors and the ZCC were keen to emphasize that the plan was merely to ‘inform’ 
people about the constitution, but not to re-write it, others insisted that one year was not enough 
time and that constitutional reform could not be ruled out.58  However, the ZCC was determined to 
keep the NCA project within its original terms, and resisted member attempts to extend the 
proposed time-frame and broaden its remit.  While the ZCC made a safe umbrella under which to 
discuss politics, the ZCC was willing to co-operate only as long as the NCA seen to be providing 
merely civic education.59  While most participants assumed that the eventual intention of the NCA 
was to reform the constitution, ZCC officials have insisted it was not until it was changed by the 
‘political’ influences.   
Throughout 1998, the NCA developed materials and trained facilitators to provide grass-
roots ‘conscientization’ similar to voter education.  The NCA intended  to train 600 facilitators – 
60 in each province – who would  proceed to organize meetings within districts.  At the same 
time, the NCA was also holding thematic discussions of land, business, youth and women’s issues 
in urban areas.  NCA officials were pleased that the Minister for Lands and Agriculture had 
attended a meeting on land and the constitution in March.  As 1998 progressed, the government’s 
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position on the constitution seemed to evolve from a reluctance to admit that there were any  
deficiencies to negotiating with the NCA over a joint framework for re-writing the constitution.  
Yet, at the same time, the NCA was increasingly being portrayed by the state media as 
unacceptably ‘political’.  This was first evident in the reluctance of the Zimbabwe broadcasting 
Corporation (ZBC) to air NCA advertisements on radio and TV.  Officials claimed  that ‘political 
advertising’ must have government approval.  Persistent court battles failed to gain the NCA 
access to ZBC channels.60   
The ZCC has always been wary of explicit political involvement and their increasingly 
fraught relationship with the NCA became visible in October 1998, as an NCA march was 
transformed into a demonstration against Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Congo war.  The 
ZCC was uncomfortable with the NCA’s stand on an explicitly political issue.  Some of its 
clerical leaders were unwilling to be associated with a protest against the government’s foreign 
adventure – especially if they, as Bishops, were expected to lead the procession through 
Harare.  On the eve of  the march, the moderator of the NCA,  Bishop Nemapare, who was 
also Vice-President of the ZCC, issued a press release stating that the ZCC would not 
participate in the march.  This enabled  police to claim that the march had been cancelled by its 
organizers, and used tear gas to disperse those who had gathered.61  Informed sources within 
the NCA and ZCC believe that Nempare was pressurized by President Mugabe to call off the 
march.62  The ZCC was particularly vulnerable to government pressure at this time because 
they needed its support to ensure the smooth functioning of the upcoming World Council of 
Churches (WCC) meeting which was to be held in Harare in December 1998.  
Frustration caused by the ZCC pull-out led the NCA, which had been housed within the 
ZCC, to move abruptly to new offices in November – a decision taken without notice being given 
to the ZCC staff who had been working with them.  ZCC staff further felt alienated as the funds 
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and computers their donors had provided were shifted to NCA accounts.   
The government’s creation of its own Constitutional Commission (CC) in March 1999 led 
the ZCC to withdraw even from membership of the NCA.  These decisions were taken at the 
highest level of the ZCC –  representatives of member churches and staff were not consulted.  The 
ZCC Secretary-General described the NCA as a process  that had grown beyond the ZCC:  ‘we 
wanted to ‘unpack’ the constitution ... [by this time] the understanding of unpacking was lost’ and 
was out of its control, ‘... they were using our credibility, the actors were being political, there was 
no way to control them .... Actors in the NCA were exploiting the ZCC.’63  
ZCC staff emphasize that as the impetus developed for the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trades Unions (ZCTU), which was a major player in the NCA,  to form a political party, ‘[i]t 
was difficult to separate issues from the party and constitutional reform ....’The churches felt 
threatened.  As a key-player said ‘…as churches we had to take issues that don’t raise too 
much dust or rock the boat too much,  but the boat was rocking.’64  By this time, the two ZCC 
staff members who had initiated the programme had left to take better remunerated jobs with 
international NGOs.  The ZCC-NCA break was complete. 
For its part, the government pursued a ‘divide and rule’ strategy of appointing key 
church members as Constitutional Commissioners, effectively splitting most  mainstream 
church denominations. The NCA and the CC  also held well-attended hearings through-out the 
country, but both encouraged the boycott of the other process, forcing individuals and 
organizations to take sides.65   
The Anglican Church did not take an official position on the NCA/CC divide, but the 
Bishop of Harare became Deputy-Chair of the CC and his Cathedral refused to let the NCA 
hold meetings on their premises.66  No similarly placed Anglicans held positions within the 
NCA,  although individual parishes and parishioners did not follow the Bishop of Harare.67  
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Indeed, an Anglican priest, Rev. Tim Neill, was widely reported in the press as calling the 
draft constitution flawed.  In a mock referendum, his upper income urban congregation voted 
overwhelmingly against the draft.68    
The Catholic Church was divided, with the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
(CCJP) remaining within the NCA, and several of their staff members playing high-profile roles. 
Their nominal superiors, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Commission (ZCBC), supported the CC 
and called for priests and the laity to make representations to it.69  Mike Auret, who was about the 
leave the CCJP and launch a political career, interpreted the Bishops’ stance cynically: ‘[They] 
have no objection to our being on the NCA, but want to hedge their bets’.70   
The President of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), Pastor Andrew 
Wutawunashe, was a Constitutional Commissioner.  However, he represented himself and his 
church, rather than EFZ, many of whose adherents were NCA supporters.  His efforts to bring EFZ 
member churches into the CC failed, as did his effort to bring the NCA into the CC.71  
In December 1999, the government revealed its draft constitution and announced that the 
first post-independence nation-wide referendum would be held in February 2000, in which the 
people would vote whether to accept the constitution or not.  The draft constitution was widely 
felt not to reflect the content of people’s submissions to the commission in the course of their 
hearings, which had been well-attended.  
In one of the most high-profile defections, Bishop Ambrose Moyo, of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, resigned from the CC in December 1999 on the grounds that the draft 
constitution did not reflect the views of the people, that the commissioners had had no time to 
study or debate the draft, and that ‘... there was no democracy in the manner in which the 
chairman ... processed both the Draft Constitution and the Final Report of the commission’.72 
The NCA/CC conflict is unique in post-colonial Zimbabwe, and perhaps comparable 
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only to the debate over UDI, for the extent to which it sparked a public debate – carried on in 
public meetings, newspaper columns, and letters to the editor – about the appropriate role for 
Churches and Church leaders in politics.73   
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In December 1999, the denominational heads met to establish a ‘united voice’ 
concerning the referendum.  At this meeting, they expressed concern not just about ‘Christian 
values’ and the failure to declare Zimbabwe a Christian nation, but also because the draft did 
not reflect the views of the people.74  The EFZ, in particular, campaigned vigorously against 
the draft constitution, on the grounds that it permitted homosexuality and did not proscribe 
pornography, euthanasia or abortion.75  Media reports claimed that the denominational heads 
would call upon Christians to vote against the draft if the referendum were not postponed and 
the draft amended.76  However, after a meeting with the Attorney-General in January they 
backed down, claiming that the current draft met their concerns about Christianity, abortion 
and gay marriages.  Christians were called upon to vote ‘... according to their own choice, 
good sense and judgement on the political issues of the draft’.77 
The subsequent defeat of the government by the NCA coalition was a landmark in 
Zimbabwe’s post-independence political development.  For the first time, the ruling 
ZANU(PF) party had not been able to impose its chosen policy.  The NCA then, can be 
understood as a remarkably successful process, launched by a Zimbabwean church-NGO, 
which provoked a state-society dialogue on issues of governance, human rights and 
democratization.  Unrest had been building for several years as the economy declined, but it 
was the NCA which created the structures, provoked the government into responding, and 
catalyzed a constructive process of dialogue.  Yet, the experience split churches and church 
organizations decisively, revealing more ambiguity than coherence under strain. 
In the post-referendum period, as rural, and then urban, areas were consumed with state-
directed violence, the Church hierarchies were much criticized for failing to speak out.78  
Church-people were not immune from this violence, and in some instances were targeted for 
particular attention.79  Nevertheless, in the post-election period, the Protestant leadership 
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continued to present themselves as available to ‘mediate’ between the state and aggrieved 
groups such as white farmers.80  More recently, however, powerful statements have been 
released, condemning the violence and calling for the restoration of law and order.81 
 
Conclusion: ‘Rocking the boat’? 
In the anecdote above, it is not clear whether the boat being rocked – and hence made unsteady 
– is the boat of state or the ecumenical boat captured in the ZCC logo.  Yet, there has clearly 
been an unsteadiness affecting both the state and the church-NGOs in recent years.  The cases 
presented illustrate that church-state relations have changed because of   external pressures in 
the form of donor funding and expectations, but also from internal pressures from membership 
and elites.  These latter are often conditioned by historical legacies, personal connections 
between church elites and political elites, and concerns for the day-to-day survival of the 
organization.   Just as historians of the liberation war stress the particularistic experiences that 
caused certain missions and churches to either support the guerrillas or the Smith regime, so 
the history of churches and church-NGOs affect their strategies vis-à-vis the state. 
Domestic factors also help us account for the changes – and also the ambiguities –  in 
church-state relations.  Between the mid-nineties, when attempts to engage the public and 
parliamentarians in discussions about economic policies failed, and the February 2000 
referendum,  there has been a substantial change in political debate and mobilization in 
Zimbabwe; this is a reaction to the dramatically reduced economic conditions  within 
Zimbabwe.82  The churches were a part of this trend, but also played their cards such that they 
did not burn all their bridges with Mugabe and the ruling ZANU(PF) – in the event of the 
latter winning the confrontation with the NCA.  Their post-election quiescence suggested that 
this tactic had proved successful, until they were shamed into action by criticism from within 
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and outside the country.  
Still, the position of churches in Zimbabwe did allow church organizations to engage in 
discussions that were taboo in other circles.  They have consistently been more active and 
effective on economic issues, election-monitoring, voter-education, and constitutional reform 
than secular NGOs.  The vehemence with which they defend their special status as ‘religious 
people’ suggests that they are aware of their ability to say and do things impossible for other 
organizations.  Churchmen and churchwomen – ordained and laity – have been accorded a 
special respect in Zimbabwe because they are thought to represent both a moral perspective, 
and a grass-roots community.  
The lessons of Zimbabwe’s liberation war and the early independent era, reinforced by 
the ambiguity of recent church-state interaction should remind us that neither churches nor 
NGOs are uniformly ‘democratic’ or ‘progressive’, but are  implicated in society and political 
culture.  Such realizations must be taken into consideration by those who theorize about 
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